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Abstract 
Over the last few years, the EU’s discourse concerning border controls has presented a paradox – on the one 
hand, the EU promotes good neighbourly relations, while on the other hand it emphasises the need to strictly 
implement the Schengen acquis on border controls and visa regimes. The main underlying obstacle to a good 
and open partnership between the EU and the candidate states, and in turn between the enlarged EU and its 
neighbours, is a lack of trust towards the EU’s neighbours: Do they have the same standards? Do they apply 
the same controls? Do their police and border guards function in the same way? One major challenge now for 
neighbours such as Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus is how to convince the EU that they can be good partners 
in fulfilling the objectives of Schengen and protecting the EU’s interest with respect to who comes in and out 
of its external borders.  
From the point of view of human contacts and cross-border cooperation, the problem of a strict application of 
Schengen will mainly affect those persons living along the border between the EU and its neighbouring 
states. Nevertheless, with respect to trade and freedom of movement within the enlarged EU in general and 
between the EU and the neighbouring states, the issues caused by an overly stringent application of Schengen 
rules will be felt beyond the border regions. 
The two main questions on which this working paper is centred are: 
•  To what extent can there be flexibility in implementing Schengen rules to prevent marginalising the new 
EU neighbours as a result of fears about ‘threats’ moving westwards across borders? 
•  What can the EU neighbours do in the short, medium and long term to promote trust and to one day hope 
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WHAT ABOUT THE NEIGHBOURS? 
THE IMPACT OF SCHENGEN ALONG THE 
EU’S EXTERNAL BORDERS 
CEPS WORKING DOCUMENT NO. 210/OCTOBER 2004 
JOANNA APAP AND ANGELINA TCHORBADJIYSKA 
1.  Historic introduction and defining the problem 
The Commission Communication to the Council and the European Parliament of 11 March 2003, 
Wider Europe – Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern 
Neighbours, recognises in its opening statement that: 
The EU has a duty, not only towards its citizens and those of new Member States, but also towards 
its present and future neighbours to ensure continuing social cohesion and economic dynamism. 
The EU must act to promote regional and sub-regional co-operation and integration that are 
preconditions for political stability, economic development and the reduction of poverty and social 
division in our shared environment.  
The EU should aim to develop a zone of prosperity and a friendly neighbourhood – a ‘ring of 
friends’ – with whom the EU enjoys close, peaceful and co-operative relations…To this end, 
Russia, the countries of Western NIS and the Southern Mediterranean should be offered the 
prospect of a stake in the EU’s Internal Market and further integration and liberalisation to 
promote the free movement of – persons, goods, services and capital (four freedoms). 
This Communication certainly makes a very positive statement of intent on behalf of the EU with 
regard to its relations not only with those candidate states that acceded on 1 May 2004 but also with 
regard to their neighbours. 
The enlargement of the European Union has created a new external EU border on the eastern part of 
the continent. For both practical and symbolic reasons, the management of this border will have a 
profound impact on relations between the EU and the non-EU parts of Europe. 
Although EU policies should be fundamentally consistent to produce the desired result, one can 
observe a distinct lack of coherence and coordination among three principal areas of EU policy, 
namely external relations, enlargement, and justice and home affairs. 
First, looking at EU foreign policies such as the common foreign and security policy (CFSP), one can 
see an attempt to maintain a certain degree of openness towards the countries neighbouring the 
enlarged EU. These declarations, however, are contradicted by the dynamics of the enlargement 
process, where the strict application of the Schengen acquis concerning border controls and visa 
regimes is required from candidate countries. Their willingness to implement all restrictive border 
provisions is considered to be one of most important indicators of their readiness for membership. 
Furthermore, and in contrast to the stance taken vis-à-vis current EU member states, this appears to be 
a non-negotiable issue. 
The underlying reason for the position taken by the EU lies in the domain of EU home affairs policy, 
which is strongly influenced by widespread fear of uncontrolled immigration from beyond the EU 
territory and criminal activity by foreigners among the societies of member states. Restrictive 
immigration controls, manifested in particular in the form of visa regimes at external borders, are seen 
as a necessary response to those fears and determine the nature of external borders. 
These fears result in a paradox: new member states are expected to introduce ‘hard’ Schengen borders 
that could negatively affect these countries’ relations with non-EU neighbours, while at the same time 
the expected advantage of lifting border controls between old and new member states, along with the 2 | APAP & TCHORBADJIYSKA 
freedom of taking up employment, will be delayed for several years after accession. This consequence 
will not only have a negative impact on future EU neighbouring countries, but it will also produce a 
sense of second-class membership among new members. The EU’s position is generated by a dual fear 
on the part of current members: fear of immigration from non-candidate countries (the citizens of 
which are all subject to the visa regime) but also the fear of immigration originating from candidate 
countries. 
Candidate states were asked to fully implement the Schengen acquis without sufficient consideration 
being given to the maintenance of stable geo-political relations in the region. In the 1990s, the 
previous walls that had divided Europe since the end of the Second World War ceased to exist. One 
was the boundary between the bloc of socialist states and Western Europe. The other, far less 
frequently mentioned, was the heavily guarded border between the USSR and Moscow’s satellite 
countries. With an overly stringent implementation of the Schengen acquis by the new EU member 
states, however, we may risk building new walls between the enlarged EU and the newly independent 
states (NIS) as well as Russia. 
As a result of the complex forces that brought down these walls in the early 1990s, a unique area of 
liberalised movement of persons was sought in Central Europe. It was not a full free movement of 
persons as the expression ‘liberalised movement of persons’ may imply: individuals still required a 
special voucher in addition to their passport and preferably a letter of invitation to present at the 
border, or a simplified pass in the case of the residents of the border regions. Yet these documents 
were relatively easy to obtain, which facilitated a substantial movement of persons in the region.
1  
The citizens of the states that became candidates for membership of the EU were granted the 
possibility to travel to the EU without visas (with the initial exceptions of Bulgarian and Romanian 
citizens).
2 On the other hand, inhabitants of countries such as Russia, Ukraine or Belarus have been 
able to travel to Central and Eastern Europe without major difficulty. The ‘open-borders policy’ 
(which was in actual fact a controlled open-borders policy) was a part of a wider strategy of 
maintaining good relationships with neighbouring countries as pursued by the governments of the 
Central European states. The West has encouraged such regional and bilateral cooperation since the 
fall of the Berlin Wall. This policy stance is generally seen to have played a significant role in 
preventing destabilisation in the region, as occurred after the First World War in Central and Eastern 
Europe, and as happened in the Balkans in the 1990s. The open-borders policy has affected thousands 
of ordinary citizens on both sides of the border and has significantly contributed to efforts to overcome 
the historical legacy of prejudice, stereotypes and resentment. Among the numerous examples one 
may single out the difficult and blood-stained relationships between Poland and Russia, between 
Poland and Ukraine, and between Hungary and Romania. Open borders have also fostered the contacts 
of national minorities with their native countries, such as the Byelorussians in Poland or the 
Hungarians in Ukraine (Trans-Carpatia), Yugoslavia (Vojvodina) and Romania. 
The EU accession of Central European states such as Poland, Hungary and Slovakia has to a certain 
extent led to the disappearance of that specific area of liberalised movement of persons, unless 
acceptable flexible approaches to implementing the Schengen acquis can be found. As EU candidate 
countries adopt the Schengen acquis, they have already had to impose visas on citizens of 
neighbouring countries that are not in line for EU membership in the context of its enlargement. From 
the point of view of human contacts and cross-border cooperation, the main problem of a strict 
application of Schengen will mainly affect those persons living in the border regions – as in the case of 
those residing along the borders between Ukraine and Poland, Ukraine and Slovakia, Ukraine and 
                                                 
1 This view has been confirmed by various interviewees based in Brussels from DG External Relations (DG 
RELEX), DG Enlargement and DG Justice and Home Affairs in the European Commission as well as high-level 
personnel in missions in Brussels from Poland, Hungary, Romania, Slovakia and Ukraine. 
2 Nationals of Romania and Bulgaria can now travel to and within the Schengen zone without visas but still 
require visas for travel to the UK and Ireland. WHAT ABOUT THE NEIGHBOURS? | 3 
Hungary, and Ukraine and Romania. These individuals and others residing and working in the border 
regions will be the first to be affected by the extension of the Schengen regime to new member states. 
The strict application of the Schengen border regime in general and visa policy in particular will 
directly affect and reinforce the growing socio-economic and psychological gap between the two parts 
of Europe. It will also adversely affect national minorities, such as Hungarian minorities living in the 
states neighbouring Hungary, whose nationals now require a visa to enter the enlarged EU. With 
regard to Hungary and its neighbours, the nationals of Ukraine and Serbia, including Hungarian 
minorities who do not possess a Hungarian passport, will eventually be subject to the Schengen visa 
regime to enter Hungary (with the exception of nationals from Romania and Slovakia). These persons 
already require a national visa from Hungary in order to cross the border. 
For the first time since the end of the cold war, the EU will border an area that has essentially different 
political, economic and social systems. The imposition of restrictive principles for crossing the borders 
will contribute to widening these gaps, which will be detrimental to the European Union as a whole. 
2.  General overview of the Schengen acquis 
The EU has imposed a fixed set of rules on new members, laid out in some 3,000 pages of the 
Schengen acquis. 
Freedom of movement – one of fundamental rights of EU citizens − is suffering various obstructions. 
Sixteen years since the signing of the Schengen Agreements in 1985, there are still visible and hidden 
barriers to the free movement of persons. 
Schengen was expected to facilitate the free movement of persons in the Schengen zone. Before one 
can gain access to the Schengen area, however, various conditions need to be fulfilled by the nationals 
of countries that are subject to the visa regime. A lack of transparency and barriers to access to 
information persist in the granting of Schengen visas.  
The Amsterdam Treaty, which came into force on 1 May 1999, attaches a Protocol on Schengen to the 
EC and EU Treaties that in effect provides for the insertion of the Schengen Agreement 1985, the 
Schengen Implementing Convention 1990 and the decisions of the Executive Committee made under 
the two agreements into the EC Treaty insofar as they involve borders and third country nationals. The 
same Protocol provides for moving into the Third Pillar of the Treaty on European Union those 
provisions of Schengen relating to policing and criminal judicial cooperation. 
The initial Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 created a framework for the abolition of border 
controls on persons and goods between participating states. It was supplemented by the Schengen 
Implementing Agreement 1990, which set out the detailed provisions on the abolition of border 
controls between the participating states, the application of controls at the common external border of 
the participating states, provisions on division of responsibility in respect of asylum
3 and provisions on 
police cooperation. The creation of the Schengen system arose from an economic pressure not least 
from the transport industry to remove obstacles to cross-border trade within the European Union 
(Bigo, 1996). It was foreshadowed by the European Commission’s White Paper on the Completion of 
the Single Market (Papdemetriou, 1996).  
The Implementing Agreement entered into force in September 1993 but was not applied in any 
Schengen state (among the European Union member states, only 13 are fully party on Schengen) until 
26 March 1995.  
                                                 
3 These provisions were superseded by the Convention determining the state responsible for examining 
applications for asylum lodged in one of the member states of the European Communities (Dublin Convention) 
of 14 June 1990 when it came into force in September 1997, and which has been replaced by the Council 
Regulation establishing the criteria and mechanisms of determining the Member State responsible for examining 
an asylum application lodged in one of the Member States by a third country national, (EC) No. 343/2003.  4 | APAP & TCHORBADJIYSKA 
Even after that date France maintained border checks on persons moving between France and the other 
Schengen states. The abolition of border controls was achieved with Greece in March 2000 and the 
Nordic states in December 2000. The major themes of legal acts in the Schengen acquis are:  
•  uniform visa, common visa policy; 
•  common consular instructions; 
•  Schengen Information System; 
•  SIREN (cooperation over national security databases); 
•  harmonisation for declarations of invitation, responsibility; 
•  uniform model of residence permit; 
•  policy of transfer and readmission agreements; 
•  extradition; 
•  removal of obstacles at internal borders; 
•  computerised consultation of central authorities; 
•  Schengen mode of organisation in airports; 
•  common stamps of entry and exit at external borders; 
•  narcotics – legal cooperation; 
•  public safety – police cooperation; 
•  clandestine immigration; 
•  illicit traffic in weapons; 
•  stolen vehicles; 
•  expulsion of minors; 
•  terrorism; and 
•  trans-border police cooperation. 
As regards movement of persons, the Schengen system is based on three main principles:  
1.  no third-country national should gain access to the territory of the Schengen states (with or 
without a short-stay visa) if he or she might constitute a ‘security risk’ for any one of the states; 
2.  an assumption that entry across one Schengen external border constitutes admission to the whole 
territory and an assumption (not as high as a presumption in law) that a short-stay visa issued by 
any participating state will be recognised for entry to the common territory for the purpose of 
admission (there are explicit exceptions justifying refusal specifically on security grounds); and 
3.  once within the common territory, the person is entitled (subject again to security exceptions) to 
move within the whole of the territory for three months out of every six without further control at 
the internal borders of the participating states.  
The main focus of the system is to ensure that persons who are or might be considered unwanted by 
any participating state are not permitted into the territory. Thus the rules focus on who must be 
excluded and provide little guidance on who should be admitted. Because the underlying principle of 
the system is mutual recognition of national decisions rather than harmonisation, the search for legal 
mechanisms to achieve this has unexpected implications. The lifting of border controls between the 
states means that positive decisions on the admission of persons are likely to be respected by default – 
the parties have fewer identity checks when crossing the borders.
4 
The principles of the Schengen system are at present achieved through the deployment of four tools:  
1.  The Schengen Information System (SIS), which operates in 13 member states and two non-
member states (Norway and Iceland), allows the competent authorities of the mentioned states to 
acquire information regarding persons and property. The implication of having one’s name on the 
                                                 
4 But see K. Groenendijk’s presentation on the maintenance of internal checks on persons after the entry into 
force of the Schengen Implementing Agreement 1990, Article 62 EC and EU Borders, Conference 11/12 May 
2001, ILPA/Meijers Committee, London. WHAT ABOUT THE NEIGHBOURS? | 5 
SIS list could range from simply having one’s documents scrutinised every time one enters the 
Schengen zone to a blank refusal of a visa. Not all Schengen countries feel obliged to offer a 
reason for refusing to issue a visa and this is a policy area that is still governed by the principle of 
sovereignty of each Schengen state. The persons usually included in the SIS database are those 
who either have a criminal record (even simply defined as a threat to public order) or have 
possibly been subject to a criminal act, for example, persons whose documents were stolen while 
visiting or residing in a Schengen country. The Council meeting on 28 and 29 May 2001 
confirmed the development of the so-called ‘SIS II’ by 2006 as a priority.
5 The second generation 
of the SIS does indeed bring new technical and investigation facilities, such as additional, new 
identification materials for the member states. 
2.  A common list of countries whose nationals require visas to come into the common territory for 
short stays (visits up to three months) and a common list of those excluded from the requirement – 
the definitive black and white lists were achieved in December 1998.
6 
3.  A common format and set of rules on the issue and meaning of short-stay visas, which have been 
established through Council Regulations.
7  
4.  Carrier sanctions, which have also been established.
8 
As previously mentioned, enlargement will create a new EU external border in the eastern part of the 
continent. As far as countries such as Ukraine are concerned, the legal basis of EU-Ukrainian relations 
is the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA),
9 which entered into force in 1998. Since the 
entry into force of the PCA, cooperation in the field of justice and home affairs has been enhanced 
considerably between the two sides, as can be seen in the EU Action Plan on Justice and Home Affairs 
with Ukraine adopted on December 2001. Since the events of 11 September, more emphasis has been 
given on cooperation in the fight against terrorism as well as other forms of organised crime such as 
those related to drugs, fraud, money laundering, illegal migration and human trafficking.  
Relating to the issue of movement of people across borders, a dialogue has started on the issue of 
visas. Both sides have agreed to cooperate in this field on the basis of the EU Action Plan adopted in 
December 2001; a scoreboard has been also achieved for the implementation of the mentioned plan. 
                                                 
5 See the Commission Communication to the European Parliament and the Council on the Development of the 
Schengen Information System II COM(2001) 720 final and Council Regulation (EC) No 2424/2001 on the 
development of the Second Generation Schengen Information System (SIS II) based on Arts. 66 of the Treaty 
establishing the European Community; see also the Council Decision 2001/866/JHA on the development of the 
second generation Schengen Information System (SIS II) based on Articles 30(1), 31 and 34 of the Treaty on 
European Union. 
6 See the Commission’s Proposal for a Council Regulation amending Regulation No. 539/2001 listing the third 
country whose nationals must be in the possession of visas when crossing external borders and those whose 
nationals are exempt from that requirement, COM (2002) 679, 28 November 2002, Brussels.  
7 Council Regulation (EC) No. 334/2002 of 18 February 2002 amending Regulation (EC) No. 1683/95 laying 
down a uniform format for visas, Official Journal L 053, 23 February 2002; see also Council Regulation (EC) 
No. 333/2002 of 18 February 2002 on a uniform format for forms for affixing the visa issued by Member States 
to persons holding travel documents not recognised by the Member State drawing up the form, Official Journal 
L 053, 23 February 2002, as well as the Council Regulation (EC) No. 1683/95 of 29 May 1995 laying down a 
uniform format for visas, Official Journal L 164, 14 July 1995; and the Council Recommendation of 4 March 
1996 relating to local consular cooperation regarding visas (96/c 80/01), as well as 2001/329/EC, Council 
Decision of 24 April 2001 updating part VI and Annexes 3, 6 and 13 of the Common Consular Instructions and 
Annexes 5(a), 6(a) and 8 to the Common Manual, Official Journal L 116, 26 April 2001. 
8 Council Directive 2001/51/EC of 28 June 2001 supplementing the provisions of Art. 26 of the Convention 
implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985. 
9 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, between the European Communities and their Member States, and 
Ukraine, Official Journal L 49/3, 19 February 1998.  6 | APAP & TCHORBADJIYSKA 
Within the Country Strategy Paper (2002-06),
10 concerning border management, it is evident from the 
text of the document that one of the main aims of the EU is to deal with/limit illegal immigration, the 
trafficking in human beings and smuggling of drugs, even though one of its goals is to facilitate the 
movement of people in general. The document advocates a modern border infrastructure and the 
management of borders, mainly in relation to Russia, Moldova and Belarus. 
The first JHA troika (ministers of the member state that holds the presidency and the next presidency, 
as well as the Commission) with Ukraine was arranged in November 2002. They agreed to focus joint 
efforts on a limited number of clearly defined crime areas, for instance readmission and migration, 
money laundering, trafficking in human beings and drugs, border management, sexual exploitation of 
children and child pornography, as well as corruption.  
3.  What are possible examples of effective flexibility within the scope of 
Schengen? 
3.1  Previous accessions to Schengen 
Spain, Portugal and Greece are interesting cases in the application of Schengen as they outline 
possible solutions when a country has either a specific geographic position (Spanish protectorates in 
North Africa – Ceuta and Mellila) or special relations with third countries (Portugal) or simply has 
problems with the implementation of Schengen and needs to find a temporary solution while the 
conditions are met. These three cases are presented below: 
Spain. In a Declaration attached to the Accession Treaty, Spain negotiated the continuation of the 
specific arrangements for visa exemptions for local border traffic between Ceuta and Melilla and the 
two Moroccan provinces that border them – Tetuan and Nador. Moroccan nationals who are not 
resident in the latter provinces and who wish to enter the territory of the towns of Ceuta and Melilla 
shall exclusively remain subject to the visa requirement. The validity of these visas shall be limited to 
these two towns and may permit multiple entries and exits.
11 
Portugal. The Declaration of Portugal refers to its Visa Waiver Agreement with Brazil. On accession 
to Schengen, Portugal undertook the responsibility to readmit to its territory Brazilian nationals who 
having entered the territories of other Schengen countries via Portugal are intercepted in their territory 
after the legally allowed period for which they were admitted.  
Greece. The Accession treaty was signed in 1992, but it was not until 1999 that Schengen was fully 
operational in Greece. Following several missions and reports, different aspects of the agreement were 
put into effect in 1997 and 1998. For the period of seven years, however, Greece needed to find a 
solution to serve its non-Schengen neighbours, preferably without seriously obstructing the cross-
border traffic. One of the solutions found was the issuing of visas with limited territorial validity. Such 
visas are allowed under the Schengen agreement but under certain conditions. Nevertheless, they were 
used by the Greek authorities as a temporary solution that extended over several years. 
3.2  Accession of Central and Eastern European countries  
While some EU member states have been allowed certain exceptions in Schengen, the candidate 
countries were required to implement the Schengen acquis in full upon accession.  
Moreover, any state acceding to the European Union must accept the totality of Chapter IV on 
accession. No ‘opt outs’ were be permitted for the new member states following Art. 8 of the Protocol 
                                                 
10 See the Country Strategy Paper 2002-2006, National Indicative Programme 2002-2003, Ukraine, adopted by 
the European Commission on 27 December 2001.  
11 The Schengen acquis – as referred to in Art. 1(2) of Council Decision 1999/435/EC of 20 May 1999 Official 
Journal L 176, 10 July 1999, p. 1. WHAT ABOUT THE NEIGHBOURS? | 7 
integrating the Schengen acquis into the Framework of the European Union, which establishes that 
“For the purposes of the negotiations for the admission of new Member States into the European 
Union, the Schengen acquis and further measures taken by the institutions within its scope shall be 
regarded as an acquis which must be accepted in full by all State candidates for admission”.  
Accessions to Schengen are based on the concept of ‘two accession dates’.  
•  first – accession to the EU, by which time the flanking/supportive measures of Schengen that are 
embodied by the Schengen acquis need to be put in place; and  
•  second – full membership to Schengen, by which time the new member state could participate 
actively and fully as a Schengen state.  
4.  Proposed provisions for persons living in border regions 
The European Commission has presented two Proposals for a Regulation on the establishment of a 
regime of local border traffic at the temporary external land borders between member states and on the 
establishment of a regime of local border traffic at the external land borders of the member states 
(COM[2003] 502 final).
12 
The purpose of the first proposed Regulation is to lay down rules on the criteria and conditions for 
establishing a regime of local border traffic at the temporary external land border between EU member 
states (owing to the two-step Schengen implementation and the temporary maintenance of border 
controls at the common borders between new member states and between the latter and old Schengen 
member states). Under this proposal, nationals of third countries subject to visa requirements who 
reside in areas within 50 kilometres of the EU border would be eligible for special visas that will allow 
the holder to cross the EU border many times for a stay of up to seven consecutive days and less than 
three months every half-year. It will be valid for at least one year and can be issued free of charge. 
This visa will be valid exclusively in the border area of the state that issued it.  
The second proposal establishes a regime of local border traffic at the external land borders of the 
member states and authorises member states to conclude or maintain bilateral agreements with 
neighbouring third countries for the purposes of implementing the regime. Given that the new member 
states will not apply all the provisions of the Schengen rules immediately from the date of accession, 
checks at the borders with current Schengen states and between the new member states themselves 
will remain in place for a certain period.  
As to the current state of play of the proposals, reaching agreement at the Council of Ministers has 
proved difficult. At the moment there is a partial agreement by the European Parliament.  
5.  An outsider’s experience – The case of Bulgaria 
In September 1995 after a decision of the EU ministers of justice and interior affairs, Bulgaria was 
subjected to mandatory visa requirements. The justification of this decision was defined as lack of 
security and the risk of illegal immigration.
13 The decision placed Bulgaria (and Romania, to which 
the decision referred as well) in a particularly unusual situation in relation to the other accession 
countries from Central and Eastern Europe, as such a requirement was not imposed on them. In the 
space of six years the European Union placed itself in the position of requiring substantial concessions 
on a wide variety of issues relating to borders and movement of persons as the price for removing the 
                                                 
12 These two proposals provide for a definition of local border traffic: the regular crossing of the external border 
of a member state by persons lawfully resident in the border area (restricted to 50km) of a neighbouring third 
country, in order to stay in the border area of that member state for a limited period (seven consecutive days 
maximum, and in any case, for no longer than three months within any half-year period).  
13 European Dialogue, Politics and Current Affairs, No. 1, Jan-Feb 1996 (retrievable from 
http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/dg10). 8 | APAP & TCHORBADJIYSKA 
visa requirement.
14 In this period the Bulgarian government and society as a whole started working on 
the comprehensive strategy aiming at the ultimate exemption of Bulgarian citizens from the 
requirement of visas. Ultimately, following the incorporation of the Schengen borders acquis into the 
EC Treaty, a new Regulation on the countries whose nationals require a visa to enter the territory for a 
short stay and those who do not was adopted by the Council in March 2001 and Bulgaria was removed 
from the black list.
15 
The Commission’s report on Bulgaria consists of four main sections:
16 
1)  the legal framework and administrative practices at Bulgarian borders, including visa policy – 
whether the Bulgarian visa list corresponds to that of the Union, border surveillance, carrier 
sanctions, sanctions for illegal migration to the member states and sanctions on facilitators of 
illegal migration to the member states; 
2)  repatriation of Bulgarian nationals to Bulgaria – whether member states are having trouble 
repatriating Bulgarians to Bulgaria; 
3)  additional measures such as technical equipment at borders and cooperation with Greece, 
including tour operators; and 
4)  the conclusions of the report. 
Looking at the report more closely, in section 1 the Bulgarian report notes the following matters as 
relevant to the lifting of the visa requirements: 
•  Bulgaria has introduced new passports that meet the requirements of the EU with regard to safety 
measures against forgery. 
•  The facilities for issuing visas at the border have been abolished; criminal sanctions and fines for 
irregular border crossing and forged documents have been set. 
•  Concerning sanctions on illegal emigration to the member states, Bulgaria has introduced 
legislation making it a criminal offence in Bulgaria to commit an offence against the immigration 
law of any member state, over which immigration laws the Bulgarian government has no control. 
•  Sanctions have been established on the facilitation of illegal immigration/emigration. 
•  Bulgaria is aligning its visa policy to that of the EU – it is in the process of introducing visa 
requirements for Georgians, Russians, Ukrainians and Tunisians. For the moment it is only 
seeking to maintain a visa-free regime with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Macedonia; 
•  Staffing and equipment at Bulgarian borders have been provided. 
Under section 2, repatriation of illegal residents to Bulgaria, the Commission notes as relevant to the 
decision whether to maintain or abolish visa requirements that Bulgaria has readmission agreements in 
force with ten member states and six other states; further readmission agreements are in the process of 
conclusion. The signing of readmission agreements with each of the member states that seeks such an 
agreement was of primary importance in the press releases regarding the lifting of visa requirements 
for the Baltic States. Further, additional readmission agreements are being negotiated with many other 
countries. 
In section 3, additional measures to be taken by Bulgaria are set out. These include more computerised 
control systems at border posts, an action plan with Greece, more legislation on carriers’ sanctions to 
                                                 
14 See E. Guild (2001), “Moving the Borders of Europe”, Inaugural lecture, University of Nijmegen. 
15 See OJ 2001 L 81/1. 
16 See the Report from the Commission to the Council regarding Bulgaria in the perspective of the adoption of 
the regulation determining the list of third countries whose nationals must be in a possession of visas when 
crossing the external borders and those whose nationals are exempt of that requirement COM(2001) 61 final, 02 
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provide for penalties on carriers who take persons out of Bulgaria who do not have the necessary 
documents to enter wherever they are going. Here again is an example of cross-recognition. The 
Bulgarian government has no control over the documents that may or may not be required by the 
border officials in another state. Yet they are planning to pass legislation (on the approval of the 
Commission), that would place sanctions on carriers departing from Bulgaria with persons who are 
ultimately refused admission to the country of destination. Clearly the Commission has the EU 
member states in  mind, but as is clear from the Schengen acquis, it is by no means self evident 
whether an individual will be admitted by one member state or another in the common territory. 
Finally, in section 4 there is a description of an information campaign to Bulgarian citizens advising 
them of the limits of their new visa-free travel right. An oblique passage refers to working contacts 
between Bulgarian authorities, the tour operators association and the consulates of the member states. 
Exactly what is meant is unclear. Nevertheless, officials at the French ministry of foreign affairs 
indicated that tour operators play a central role in obtaining visas for those using their services. In 
order to be able to provide their services and reduce loss-making risks, they have developed close 
links with consular staff in many obligatory visa countries. The degree of reliance that consular staff 
place on the presentation of visa applications from certain tour operators in preference to others has 
important commercial consequences for the operators. In the context of local consular cooperation, 
consular officials exchange information about reliability of tour operators as visa intermediaries. 
The result of this report is that since March 2001 Bulgarian nationals no longer require a visa to travel 
to EU countries. 
This effect was achieved not only as a result of legal and administrative reforms undertaken by the 
Bulgarian authorities but also thanks to certain political decisions. In March 1997 Bulgaria had already 
unilaterally lifted the visa requirement for EU nationals entering Bulgaria for short stays. At a later 
stage, simultaneous with the legislative changes taking place, it is worth noting the political consensus 
reached among all political parties and their concerted effort in the rapid adoption of all necessary 
legislation. Political leaders played an important role though their meetings with EU counterparts by 
providing information at the European and member-state levels about the efforts and results achieved 
by Bulgaria. 
6. Conclusions 
The perception of EU enlargement among the EU’s future eastern neighbours has both positive and 
negative aspects. Ukraine, for instance, sees itself as threatened with marginalisation from the rest of 
Europe, while simultaneously envisioning the potential for increased prosperity on the western border 
of Ukraine, which will lie along the future EU frontier. With this in mind, the repercussions of the 
events of 11 September and 11 March are potentially double-edged: on the one hand, these events 
have led to an increase in the rhetoric of mutual cooperation between Ukraine and the EU 
member/candidate countries and Russia; simultaneously, they have also led to increased calls for a 
‘Fortress Europe’. In order to raise the level of cooperation along the future EU border, the following 
steps are necessary: 
•  Technical aspects need to be adequately prepared, well in advance of applying for accession. 
•  The cost of visas for EU countries needs to be harmonised. 
•  The motivation for ‘blacklisted’ countries (as in the case of Ukraine) to cooperate with the EU 
needs to be increased. 
•  The implementation of Tacis/Interreg projects focused on common borders. In this context, it 
should be noted that the current lack of cooperation between Tacis and Phare projects can prove to 
be a real obstacle in the development of cross-border projects. 
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The debate surrounding visa regimes on the future EU border often incorporates such images as a 
‘new Berlin Wall’ or ‘a new iron curtain’, which suggest a dominating ideological factor to the issue 
of visa policy.  
The problems of border controls are often directly linked to the question of visa regimes. Yet several 
other factors play a major role in the problem of the movement of persons across borders. Most 
significant is the issue of cross-border infrastructure, which needs to be addressed through specific 
Tacis and Interreg projects. Issues related to the cross-border shadow economy need to be addressed 
primarily with fiscal tools, rather than with visa regimes. A very strict application of Schengen will 
affect mainly those persons living in the border regions – as in the case of those residing along the 
borders of Ukraine and Poland, Ukraine and Slovakia, Ukraine and Hungary and Ukraine and 
Romania. Those persons residing and working in the border regions will be the first affected by the 
Schengen regime. 
A close inspection of the implementation of the Schengen acquis, however, shows that in reality there 
is scope for flexibility. It is important to keep in mind that inflexible policies, such as the zero-
migration policy of the early 1990s, which saw waves of illegal migration bolstered by economic 
demand, are of spurious efficiency. Hence there is a need to: 
•  define the exact scope of flexibility for candidate countries in the implementation of the Schengen 
acquis; 
•  identify the actors responsible for these competencies; 
•  promote a climate of trust and cooperation between member states, candidate countries and their 
future eastern neighbours; 
•  analyse potentially flexible practices and assess the viability of exporting these to other parts of 
the future border.  
Possible models for border practice between the accession states on the new eastern EU border and for 
Ukraine can be seen in the Greek and Portuguese practices in the issuing of residency permits to 
Albanian citizens in the Albanian/Greek border areas and to Brazilian nationals, respectively (see 
section 3). Another possible model is the case of Spain and the protocol annexed in the Schengen 
acquis with respect to the status of citizens of Ceuta and Mellila – which are two North-African 
protectorates of Spain. This second model can especially be applied for those Ukrainian nationals 
residing in the border region close to what will become the new Schengen border. Similar to residents 
of Ceuta and Mellila, these persons can be granted a one-year residence permit by Poland to facilitate 
their movements on a daily basis across the border. This residence permit will only allow an individual 
to freely enter Poland if it is issued by Poland, but it would permit the holders of such a permit to 
travel according to Schengen rules for three months out of six and six months out 12 in the rest of 
Schengen zone. Such a residence permit is considered as the equivalent of a visa for travel within 
Schengen zone, but would bring an additional benefit with respect to travel to Poland.  
There is a need to differentiate between the conceptual/political barriers to the free movement of 
people across the Schengen border and the technical barriers. If trust and political will exist, they will 
suffice to surmount these conceptual barriers, then solutions can be found on the technical level. The 
dialogue about trust is currently taking place on three levels: between the future Eastern European 
neighbours and the accession countries, between EU member states and accession countries, and 
among EU member states. There needs to be a convergence of these dialogues if the climate of trust 
between these three groups is to be developed.  
Visa regimes must not be viewed as intractable ideological barriers threatening to slice up Europe, but 
rather a challenge that can be surmounted with the necessary political will and technical innovation. In 
looking to define more closely what impels the actual dynamic of the implementation of visa regimes, 
several rationales maybe outlined: EU enlargement, foreign relations, migration policy and economic 
demands. These rationales are often mutually exclusive. For example, economic demands dictate that 
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businessmen to obtain visas for visiting Ukraine; yet the logic of reciprocity in foreign relations means 
that such steps could not conceivably be taken without the promise that the EU will eventually 
consider taking identical measures with respect to businessmen from neighbouring states. It is the 
dynamic between these various rationales, along with concrete technical factors, that will dictate the 
effect of visa regimes on the free movement of persons along the future border of the EU.  
7. Recommendations 
7.1  Recommendations to neighbouring states 
The experience of Bulgaria coming off the negative visa list could provide some key strategies for 
neighbours such as Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova and Russia. Although countries such as Ukraine are not 
yet EU-candidate countries, the recent developments in EU-Ukrainian relations show that the ‘external 
relations’ criteria refer to this eventual possibility, especially if Ukraine implements certain reforms. 
Similar developments could also be considered for the other neighbours. 
This, however, is a first step. The actual legal changes require strong political will, trust on the side of 
all actors and a well-trained administration capable of implementing the adopted acts. The key steps in 
the legislative field are: 
Short term 
•  unilaterally abolishing visas for citizens of the European Union; 
•  strengthening controls on all Ukrainian borders – borders and border controls must be introduced 
with Belarus and Russia with the support and guidance of the European Union; by introducing 
these borders Ukraine would see a decrease in the difficulties surrounding its western borders; 
•  establishing joint Polish/Ukrainian patrols along their shared borders; 
•  signing expatriation/repatriation agreements with EU member states, which will increase trust and 
confidence towards Ukraine. 
Medium term 
•  improving the quality of Ukrainian passports; 
•  introducing new (if not existent) criminal offences related to migration; and 
Long term  
•  making a concerted political effort to achieve the removal of Ukraine from the visa black list. 
The removal of Ukraine from the black list appears remote today considering the wide divergence 
between living standards in Ukraine and the EU member states and the sheer size of the country, with 
a population of 50 million. In the longer term, efforts towards real reforms could make removal from 
the visa black list serious consideration. This would require the establishment of an effective control 
system on the external border, so as to eliminate the crossing of the border by persons recorded in the 
Schengen Information System. It would also be important to put effective controls in place on the 
Russian-Ukrainian border. Controls on the border, although not directly relevant to the issue of visas, 
would enhance the growth of confidence in Ukraine and could serve as an additional instrument of to 
stop illegal immigration from non-EU countries.  
7.2  Recommendations to the EU and accession states 
The specific recommendations contained in this paper focus on the visa policy of an enlarged EU. 
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Another important aspect of border controls is the Schengen Information System. The implication of 
having one’s name on the SIS list could range from simply having one’s documents scrutinised every 
time one enters the Schengen zone, to a blank refusal of a visa. Not all Schengen countries feel obliged 
to offer a reason for refusing to issue a visa and this is a policy area that is still governed by the 
principle of sovereignty of each Schengen state. The persons usually included in the SIS database are 
those who either have a criminal record (even simply defined as a threat to public order) or have 
possibly been subject to a criminal act, for example, persons whose documents were stolen while 
visiting or residing in a Schengen country. 
The recommendations proposed below can be divided into two basic groups:  
The first group includes recommendations for the near future. The assumption here is that because of 
the political climate in the member states, neither a major amendment of the Schengen acquis nor an 
approach of partial or selective implementation of the acquis by accession countries is possible at 
present. Specific options can be undertaken by the candidate states and the European Union in order to 
minimise the potentially negative effects on the movement of persons between non-candidate 
countries and prospective members. These options are based on the premise that the Schengen acquis 
leaves a certain margin of flexibility and adjustment to meet the particular needs at hand.  
The second group includes far-reaching recommendations, based on the belief that the Schengen 
provisions should be modified to better serve the fundamental aim of an open, free and undivided 
Europe as proclaimed by the European Union.  
7.2.1 Solutions within the Schengen acquis framework 
The recommendations presented below take into account the assumption that the candidate countries 
will introduce visa requirements on the traffic of persons from the blacklisted states no later than their 
date of accession to EU membership. Their principal aim is to alleviate the undesirable results of the 
introduction of the visa regime and enable easier access to visas, so as to remove the major 
impediments preventing the citizens of Eastern Europe from travelling to Central European countries. 
The achievement of this goal requires a range of activities and the fulfilment of numerous conditions, 
as presented below.  
a) Upgrading and reinforcement of consular services 
More consular staff. In order to process a similar number of persons crossing these borders today, the 
majority of whom possess single-entry visas, more consular staff will be required in order to provide 
for smooth cross-border traffic. This point is valid for the current EU countries but particularly for the 
new member states such as Poland, which has extensive traffic with Ukraine.  
The visa procedure for non-EU citizens can be simplified through the establishment of a single EU 
consulate in non-EU countries.  
b) Types of visas that could facilitate the movement of persons – National visas  
Before lifting border controls between old and new members. National visas issued by candidate 
countries prior to accession may be less rigorous, as they do not expose the EU members to any risk. 
Once the candidate countries become members, border controls will be maintained on the existing 
internal borders (e.g. Poland-Germany, Hungary-Austria) for some time. The applicant countries will 
continue to be able to issue national visas on hitherto existing principles, since the citizens of the 
Eastern European states possessing such visas will not be able to cross the border of the country that 
issued the visa.  
After lifting border controls between old and new members. The national visa will then change its 
function. In accordance with the Schengen acquis, it will only be issued for long-term residence, i.e. 
for stays of more than three months. It will only entitle the holder to reside in the area of the country WHAT ABOUT THE NEIGHBOURS? | 13 
that issues such a visa. Travel to other countries would take place according to Schengen rules and the 
residence card granted with the national visa will serve as a Schengen visa to travel to other states for 
a period of not more than three months over six months and six months over a 12-month period. It is 
technically feasible for third-country citizens holding long-term national visas to cross the internal 
border, but the risk of sanctions in the event that the authorities learn of the holders of such a visa 
over-staying in another member state (complete ban on all entry to the EU for several years) should 
serve as adequate deterrence.  
Issuing long-term national visas in large numbers may become one of the main mechanisms to 
facilitate travel by Ukrainian citizens to accession countries willing to pursue such a liberal policy.  
It would comply with the Schengen acquis. The implementation of such a policy, however, would 
require political dialogue with the member countries in order to reassure them of the good will of the 
new members of the Union.  
An important model to look at here is the case of Spain and the protocol annexed in the Schengen 
acquis with respect to the status of citizens of Ceuta and Mellila – two North-African Spanish 
protectorates. This model can especially be applied for those Ukrainian nationals residing in the border 
region close to what will become the new Schengen border. Similar to residents of Ceuta and Mellila, 
these persons can be granted a one-year residence permit by Poland to facilitate their movements on a 
daily basis across the border. This permit would allow the holder the right to freely enter Poland and to 
travel according to Schengen rules for three months out of six and six months out of 12 in the rest of 
the Schengen zone. Such a residence permit is seen as being equivalent to a visa for travel within the 
Schengen zone and would give additional benefits for travel to Poland. Similar methods have also 
been adopted by Greece and Portugal (see section 3) and they are fully in compliance with the 
technical aspects of Schengen. 
c) The Schengen visa (allowing the holder to stay in all EU member states) 
The key purpose of the visa procedure is to eliminate the risk of illegal immigration. In principle, 
however, the verification procedures contained in the acquis are intended to evaluate the risk of 
immigration in accordance with local conditions.  
One example of a practical solution would be to eliminate the interview process (they are not 
obligatory according to the acquis) or to perform an interview only for first-time visa applicants. 
Practical facilitation could also be provided by the granting of multiple-entry visas valid for one year, 
which the Schengen acquis allows. Given the possibility of issuing a long-term national visa, a visa 
valid for a period longer than one year (which is permitted by the Schengen Treaty in certain cases), 
does not appear to be all that important.  
Individuals who should be given priority access to these two categories of visas, i.e. the long-term 
national visa and the multiple-entry Schengen visa valid for one year (allowing a stay of up to six 
months) may be divided into the following categories of those persons who are: 
a)  involved in business activities;  
b)  active in culture, science, scholarship holders, students, sports;  
c)  visiting their families; 
d)  inhabitants of border regions (such visas could become a substitute for the simplified non-visa 
cross-border movement that occurs in border areas but which would not be compatible with 
Schengen); and 
e)  representatives of local government authorities or activists of non-government organisations 
(NGO). 
Should it prove impossible to introduce small-scale non-visa movement, the issuance of long-term 
visas is a good alternative for the purpose of maintaining extensive cross-border contacts. 14 | APAP & TCHORBADJIYSKA 
d) Inexpensive visas 
Ideally, single-visit visas should be free of charge, with the cost covered by the EU. This would send a 
strong political signal at a modest price. As a second-best solution, the price of single-visit visas 
should not exceed €5-10 and multiple-entry Schengen visas and long-term national visas allowing 
visits for defined periods of time should be in the range of €10-20. The low price is like a declaration 
of intent: we do not wish to establish barriers or additional obstacles. A simultaneous reduction of 
prices to the same level by all of the member states could be a valuable and well-received gesture to 
accompany the enlargement. The recent declaration by Poland that they are planning to issue visas for 
Ukrainian nationals free of charge is the first signal in that direction. 
e) Development and upgrading of border crossings  
The EU should invest in the technical infrastructure at border crossings, which should ensure the 
efficient and speedy crossing of the border. It should also contribute more to the establishment of new 
border crossings on an external frontier where needed. A properly developed infrastructure of border 
crossings with an adequate capacity to efficiently manage the movement of persons across the external 
border will be an important political message. 
f) Mutuality on the part of East European states  
The quest for ways to alleviate the impact of the introduction of visas ought to be the subject of 
political dialogue not only of a bilateral nature (by the new members with the individual Eastern 
European non-candidate states), but also between the Union and the individual countries of Eastern 
Europe. The dialogue should cover the following issues: 
•  coordination of mutual measures by each party in visa policy and a civilised introduction of visas, 
i.e. by giving adequate advance notice and by broadly disseminating the respective information 
addressed to the people concerned; 
•  the introduction of mechanisms aimed at reducing the fear of illegal immigration on the part of the 
countries of the Union, i.e. by increasing the effectiveness of the readmission agreements (with 
Ukraine for example) and also by signing such agreements with other countries; and 
•  The introduction of similar non-restrictive mechanisms with regard to citizens of the EU countries 
travelling to Eastern Europe.  
Unfortunately, there is little evidence of enthusiasm as yet among Eastern European political elites for 
engaging in a dialogue of this kind. The requirement to apply for a visa will be an inconvenience 
above all for the ordinary citizen, rather than for politicians or affluent businessmen. Even with elite 
political will, the inefficiency of the state administration may be a major hindrance to the effectiveness 
of such dialogue. Nevertheless, support for such dialogue ought to be one of the main components of 
the long-term foreign policy of the Union, and should not remain solely within the competence of the 
ministries of internal affairs of the individual EU states.  
The introduction of visas for the citizens of the newly admitted member countries of the Union by the 
countries of Eastern Europe remains a virtually unnoticed impact of the introduction of the Schengen 
acquis. Inefficiency of the administration could effectively discourage travels to the East, which even 
under the present arrangements for visa-free movement are not very frequent. Paradoxically, the 
decline of traffic in that direction may turn out to be far more painful in the longer term. Such a 
situation would widen the distance between the neighbouring nations and reinforce their ignorance of 
one another. In order to avoid this, the possibility of granting support for the development and 
modernisation of consular services of the Eastern European countries with the assistance of aid 
programmes should be taken into serious consideration. More importantly, the future Eastern 
European neighbours of the EU should be encouraged not to reciprocate in kind when the EU 
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accept politically, the European Union’s neighbours should recognise that the EU’s concerns are 
legitimate, and that it would be counter-productive to make this issue a contest of political will. 
7.2.2 Long-term solutions 
At present the European Union does not seem to favour introducing modifications to the Schengen 
Treaty or any far-reaching changes in the visa policy with respect to the Eastern European countries. 
There is a need for public debate on this issue.  
a) Modification of the visa black list 
Citizens of Ukraine must produce a visa upon entering the EU. The possibility of removing the 
Eastern European countries from the black list in the future should be considered. Their presence on 
the list is largely caused by the fear of intensive immigration. Such fears were expressed in advance of 
previous EU enlargements, but with hindsight were discovered to be unfounded. The same fear was 
evident at the beginning of the 1990s, when the matter of the removal of visas for Central European 
citizens was discussed in the EU. The experience of the past decade has demonstrated, however, that 
the fear of a flood of immigration from countries such as Poland or Hungary was completely 
unjustified.  
b) The possibility to obtain a visa on the border 
At present, visas are issued on the border only in exceptional cases. The future development of the 
technical infrastructure of the SIS (introduction of easy-to-use magnetic readers, popularisation of 
passports with a magnetic code) would allow visas to be issued on the border. That would require the 
application of readers able to immediately and automatically print visa stickers. Such a possibility 
could apply to persons who have passed the procedure of visa application before and have a clear 
record in the SIS. The inspection of passport documents with the use of a reader and the comparison of 
data upon the person’s departure from the EU area would allow an immediate determination of 
whether the duration of the visit had been exceeded.  
This could in time lead to the abolition of visas as such. According to this scenario, a visa would only 
be issued at the initiative of a person travelling to the countries of the European Union. Its purpose 
would also be to reduce the risk of refusal of entry and the related losses owing to the travel expenses 
incurred. A model of universal movement without visas (currently allowing for visits of up to three 
months) would require advanced SIS technological solutions. Similar to the above-mentioned 
scenario, the so-called ‘traditional visa procedure’ could be compulsory upon the first visit.  
c) Multiple single-day entry visa 
One way to simplify the entry of citizens living close to the EU’s future border (e.g. western Ukraine), 
and at the same time prevent them from staying illegally in other EU countries, is to provide them with 
a multiple single-day entry visa (MDV). It would be a travel document valid only together with a 
passport allowing a maximum of (for example) an 18-hour stay in one of these countries. If the person 
exceeded the duration of stay allowed by the visa, the border guards would retain the MDV and from 
that time forward the person concerned could only enter the country on the basis of a Schengen visa.  
The MDV could work like a credit card, which would facilitate handling and make the clearance 
procedure quicker. Upon entry to Poland, it would be inserted in a reader machine. If the allowed 
duration of stay has been exceeded, the machine would withhold the card upon the return. It would 
limit the possibilities for persons using a document of that type for moving across to the territories of 
other EU countries, as for example a journey from the area of Eastern Europe to Germany and back 
within 18 hours is practically impossible. At the same time, such a border clearance regime would 
enable the individual to maintain small business trade, neighbourly and family contacts, as well as 
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d) A better balance between openness and control  
The long-term foreign policy on the part of the European Union should effectively limit the criminal 
phenomena such as the smuggling of people by organised criminal groups, without isolating the 
immediate neighbours of the Union at the same time. The demographic situation (the dramatic ageing 
of society and the fall of the birth rate below the level of simple reproduction of generations) both in 
the countries of Western and Central Europe, with the resulting implications for the employment 
markets, pension systems and health care systems, demonstrate clearly that Europe is in need of 
immigrants.  
For this reason, entry to the EU for hundreds of seasonal workers should be legalised. The existing 
policy involves immense hypocrisy. On the one hand, we pretend to abide by stringent and restrictive 
laws and on the other we tolerate the existence of extensive areas of shadow economy based on 
immigrant labour, which is undoubtedly beneficial. Both the immigration regulations and the 
insurance and tax regulations need to be reconsidered, as they provide the soil in which such criminal 
activities grow. Although immigration policy is above all a challenge to the 25 EU member states, it 
increasingly also concerns the future member states, as shown by the experience of recent years. 
Undoubtedly, the scenarios presented here require significant investment for the visa-free border 
control methods to be effective. The new members, on whom the core burden of responsibility for 
protecting the external borders will rest, will need technical and financial support from the Union. We 
should also bear in mind, however, that the outlay of capital expenditures involved would be balanced 
by the decreasing costs of consular services, which are very high at present. 
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•  An extensive network of external collaborators, including some 35 senior associates with 
extensive working experience in EU affairs. 
Programme Structure 
CEPS is a place where creative and authoritative specialists reflect and comment on the problems 
and opportunities facing Europe today. This is evidenced by the depth and originality of its 
publications and the talent and prescience of its expanding research staff. The CEPS research 
programme is organised under two major headings: 
Economic Policy  Politics, Institutions and Security 
Macroeconomic Policy  The Future of Europe 
European Network of Economic Policy  Justice and Home Affairs 
       Research Institutes (ENEPRI)  The Wider Europe 
Financial Markets, Company Law & Taxation  South East Europe 
European Credit Research Institute (ECRI)  Caucasus & Black Sea 
Trade Developments & Policy  EU-Russian/Ukraine Relations 
Energy, Environment & Climate Change   Mediterranean & Middle East 
Agricultural Policy  CEPS-IISS European Security Forum 
In addition to these two sets of research programmes, the Centre organises a variety of activities 
within the CEPS Policy Forum. These include CEPS task forces, lunchtime membership meetings, 
network meetings abroad, board-level briefings for CEPS corporate members, conferences, training 
seminars, major annual events (e.g. the CEPS International Advisory Council) and internet and 
media relations. 